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There is no Final Judgment in the Fredericks9 Action Because Nipper Still
Has Unadjudicated Claims Against Other Parties to that Action
Douglas argues in various parts of his Brief that Nipper failed to "analyze"
or properly "explain" what Nipper meant by the statement that there is no "final
judgment" in the Fredericks' Case. Douglas goes on to say that there is a "firm"
order relating to Nipper's claims against Douglas, so there must be a "final order."
This analysis is not based in any Utah law. Douglas admits that the orders
granting summary judgment to Douglas on Nipper's pierce the corporate veil/alter
ego claims have not been certified under Rule 54 for appeal, and that there remain
outstanding issues in the Fredericks Action against other parties such that nothing
in that case can be appealed at this point in time.
Until there is a "final judgment" as to all claims and parties in the
Fredericks' Action, it cannot be appealed and it is still possible that Judge
Fredericks could modify any and all of his rulings therein. It is because of this
latter fact - that Judge Fredericks' rulings are not yet final, but could be changed
by him - that res judicata cannot apply to the claims in the Noel (Rico) Action.
Nipper has not failed to properly analyze this issue. Nipper has cited the
correct case law. Nipper has analyzed it and demonstrated that if there is no "final
judgment" in the Fredericks' case, then there can be no res judicata. And, Nipper
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has correctly represented the true fact that there is no "final judgment" in the
Fredericks' case.
Douglas cites a series of cases, Press Pubk Ltd. v. Matol Botanical Intern.,
Ltd.. 37 . 3d 1121 (Utah 2001). D'Aston v. Aston. 844 p. 2d 345 (Utah App.
1992); Berry v. Berry. 738 p. 2d 246 (Utah App. 1987); Copper State Thrift and
Loan y. Bruno. 735 p. 2d 387 (Utah App. 1987); but they are all distinguishable
from this case because the Appellate Courts in each instance found that the ruling
in those cases had in fact been final and no longer appealable.
Douglas then cites a case from Washington, Cunningham y. State. 811 p. 2d
225 (Wash. App. 1991), for the proposition that there does not have to be Rule
54(b) certification for an order to be "final" for res judicata purposes. There are
no Utah cases on point supporting Douglas5 position.
Consequently, Nipper's argument is not without merit under the current
state of Utah law.
Nipper can understand a desire to hold that Fredericks' "firm" decision
deciding that Douglas has "no personal liability" based upon Nipper's pierce the
corporate veil/ alter ego theories should be res judicata on that specific issue in the
Noel Action. Judge Fredericks did rule that the corporate shield does protect
Douglas. But that is all that Fredericks addressed. That is all that Fredericks ruled
2

on.
The other theories for relief- RICO and the like - were not previously
raised in any forum, and there is no "firm" decision by Fredericks on these issues.
Douglas did not argue in his motion for summary judgment before Fredericks that
Douglas was not a "conspirator." Nipper argued that there was no corporate veil
because Remember When was dissolved at all relevant times, and Douglas argued
to the contrary. Douglas argued only that the corporate veil protected him.
The Conspiracy Claims have never been briefed and ruled upon. Judge
Fredericks just put broad language in his ruling - "no personal liability."

The

RICO claims were never raised at all. They have not been litigated. They have
not been ruled on. But, they have now been dismissed. Why? Because Judge
Noel found that they "could have," and "should have," been brought in the
Fredericks Action.
That ruling is simply not fair under these circumstances. These claims
should not have been dismissed by Noel. They were not in fact raised in the
Fredericks Action, and "could [not] have been" raised therein because Nipper was
not aware of the facts necessary to raise them in his original Fredericks complaint.
Under Macris, Nipper is not required to amend the first action to bring later
discovered claims for relief based upon later discovered facts.
3

There is No Evidence that Nipper Knew of the Ludwigs5 Claims, or that
Douglas/Nichols/Gent had Defrauded at Least Five Other Customers, at the
Time that Nipper Filed His Complaint in the Fredericks5 Action
With respect to the "did not know" and/or "different facts'Vclaims"
analysis, Nipper's position is simple:
a.

At the time that Nipper filed his complaint in the Fredericks Action,
Nipper only knew that he had been lied to and lost his car;

b.

Nipper did not know:
i.

That the Ludwigs were the purchasers and had also been lied
to; or

ii.

That there were at least five other customers who had also been
lied to and/or defrauded;

c.

Even if Nipper had known, Nipper's Fredericks Action complaint
does not contain any RICO claims, nor does it contain any of the
Ludwigs' claims. These are new and different claims/theories for
relief.

Under the Macris case, as extensively quoted by Nipper, Nipper was under
no obligation to include these causes of action in his first complaint in the

Fredericks Action.
The complaint in the Fredericks Action does have some facts that are the
same as those pled in the RICO complaint filed in the Noel Action (i.e., the factual
allegations about what Nipper did and how Remember When and the others
obtained and then improperly disposed of Nipper's own car). But the First
Complaint does not contain any allegations about the Ludwigs' separate claims, or
about the wrongful conduct with respect to the five or so other customers who
were also defrauded. These are "different facts." The Ludwig facts are different
than the Nipper facts. The facts relating to the defrauding of the five or so other
customers are different facts than the Nipper facts. The allegations of the pattern
of racketeering are clearly "different" from those in the straight forward Nipper
breach of contract, fraud case. The RICO complaint alleges many more facts and
a clearly "different" factual pattern.
Based on what Nipper knew when he filed his first complaint, he could not
make any allegations about the Ludwigs, or the other customers. He did not know
about them. There is no evidence anywhere in the record that he did know about
them. The burden was on Douglas to show that Nipper's claims could have been
brought in the Fredericks Action. Douglas did not meet that burden. Nipper's
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claims should not have been dismissed without a showing that Nipper lmew about
and could have filed the RICO claims.
Douglas Admits that the Ludwigs Were Never Parties to the Fredericks'
Action, but Then Incorrectly Asserts that they are in Privity With the Nippers
Douglas admits on page 9 of his brief that he "does not deny, and never has
denied [sic] the Ludwigs were not parties to the Frederick Action." Douglas then
goes on to claim that the "Sandy Case'5 is now justification for res judicata as to
the Ludwigs' claims against Douglas. This was not cited by Judge Noel as any
basis for his ruling, nor did Douglas refer in any of his motions to the Sandy Case.
The Sandy Case was filed by the Ludwigs. It was brought against Douglas,
Remember When, Nipper (to force him to turn over the title), and Remember
When's bonding company, Western Surety. Nipper answered and cross-claimed
against Douglas. Westem Surety interpled the proceeds of their bond and sued all
entities that it was aware of that had claims against the bond. It was this case that
gave Nipper knowledge of the facts with respect to the Ludwigs and that other
customers claimed to have been defrauded.
There are no judgments in favor of Douglas in the Sandy Case. Once
Nipper, the Ludwigs, the other defrauded customers and Western Surety settled
their claims against one another and divided up the bond company's money, that
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case has basically sat dormant.
The RICO claims needed to be raised somewhere, and involved many more
defendants than the Fredericks Action. Nipper did not want to bring them in the
Sandy Action because the other defrauded customers were parties to that action
and Nipper did not want them to jump on Nipper's band wagon and try and obtain
a share of any recovery which Nipper obtained on his and the Ludwigs' RICO
claims.
The Fredericks Action had pretty much been resolved as to the issues
therein. Remember When was liable to Nipper for the car. Douglas was not
personally liable under a pierce the corporate veil/ alter ego theory (and probably
not Nichols either). So, that case was essentially resolved as to the issues therein
and was not going any where.
Nipper filed the new RICO complaint as a separate lawsuit because he did
not believe that any thing in the Sandy Action or the Fredericks Action precluded
Nipper from doing so. Neither of those Courts have ruled on any RICO claims.
Those claims are not pled before either of those Courts. Further, no ruling in
either the Sandy Action or the Fredericks Action precludes a finding that Douglas,
Nichols, Michael Gent and others joined together to form a racketeering
enterprise, and engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity (the defrauding of
7

Nipper, the Ludwigs and the five or so other customers). The only thing that
Fredericks ruled on is that the corporate veil shields Douglas from liability for acts
of the corporation.
It is not duplicative to proceed in the Noel Action with the RICO and
Conspiracy Claims - or with the Ludwig Claims.
Douglas Did Not Meet His Burden of Showing That the Ludwigs are Privies
of Nipper — The Facts Relating to The Ludwigs5 Interaction with Remember
When and Douglas are Different and Distinct From the Facts Relating to
Nipper
Douglas argues that the Ludwigs are in fact privies with Nipper simply
because they both seek to recover from Remember When and Douglas. The
problem with this assertion is that Douglas has not shown that the facts relating to
the fraud on Ludwig are essentially identical to those relating to the fraud on
Nipper. The Ludwigs had entirely different contacts and communications with
Remember When and Douglas. There was no showing before Judge Noel that the
fact situations were sufficiently similar that they should be found to be privies.
Douglas had the burden of proving that they were privies. On the record
before Judge Noel and as outlined by Douglas, there is no evidence that the
Ludwig were in fact privies - even with respect to the pierce the corporate veil
claims. This is because Douglas' conduct with respect to the Ludwigs, as opposed
8

to his conduct with respect to Nipper, may have been sufficient to demonstrate that
the veil should in fact have been pierced by the Ludwigs and against Douglas.
This is a factually intensive issue that was not dealt with at all by Douglas or Noel.
Although Correct that Brian Steffensen's Name Was on the Pleadings of the
Complaints in Both the Fredericks and the Noel Actions - William Middleton
Was The Attorney That In Fact Was Handling the Initial Motions in the Noel
Matter
William Middleton was the attorney who handled and argued the initial
motions in the Noel Action. Brian Steffensen handled the motion to reconsider
before Judge Noel and now this appeal.
It is Simply Unfair and Inequitable for Douglas to Escape his Admitted
Personal Liability to Nipper - Equity Demands that Nipper be Given a
Remedy Against Douglas for Douglas' Now Admitted Wrongful Conduct
Nipper really is astounded that Judge Fredericks ruled that a dissolved
limited liability company could shield Douglas from personal liability for his then
sole proprietorship - Remember When. Nipper did go back to Judge Fredericks
more than once to try and get a better idea as to why Judge Fredericks felt like a
non-existent limited liability company, and not Douglas, should be liable to
Nipper.
However, Judge Frederick did so rule - and that ruling has not yet been
appealed.
9

But, it is now absolutely crystal clear that:
a.

Nipper was defrauded;

b.

The Ludwigs were defrauded;

c.

Five other customers were defrauded;

d.

Douglas pled guilty - personally - to his criminal involvement in
these frauds;

e.

Douglas5 cohort, Michael Gent, also pled guilty to this same criminal
behavior;

f.

Douglas5 other cohort - Richard Nichols - was found guilty of his role
in these crimes after a trial;

g.

Douglas agreed to pay criminal restitution to Nipper as part of his
plea agreement;

h.

Douglas has yet to pay Nipper a single dime for the tens of thousands
of dollars in damages that Nipper has sustained at Douglas5
ADMITTED HANDS.

All of which begs the fundamental question: WHEN WILL NIPPER GET
JUSTICE?

Douglas claims that he has some how been damaged by Nipper's

attempts to obtain recovery from Douglas. How can Douglas claim this? Douglas
admitted that he wronged Nipper, and agreed as a part of his plea to pay criminal
10

restitution to Nipper!
Furthermore, how can Douglas claim in good faith that he should be paid
his attorney's fees? With Douglas' GUILTY PLEA, why should it not be clear
that it is Nipper who should be reimbursed for his attorneys' fees?
With Douglas' guilty plea of record, it has been wholly disingenuous and
wrong for Douglas to continue to assert - before Judge Noel, and now before this
Court - that Douglas should not pay Nipper the money that Douglas agreed in his
plea agreement to pay Nipper.
Douglas, Gent and Nichols must be held accountable for their wrongdoing.
They have admitted their wrongdoing - or been found guilty of it. Justice must
somehow be done. Nipper must be given a remedy and means of obtaining relief.
Given Douglas' subsequent guilty plea and agreement to pay Nipper criminal
restitution, Judge Fredericks' ruling that Douglas "has no personal liability" under
the pierce the corporate veil/ alter ego claims (when the facts about Douglas'
criminal complicity were not before him) should not bar Nipper's claims.
If this Court feels like these claims must be brought before Judge
Fredericks, then this Court should order that Judge Noel's dismissal should be
without prejudice, and direct that these claims be joined in the Fredericks Action.
The Fredericks Action remains open with no final judgment. At the very least,
11

Nipper should be allowed to bring his clearly meritorious claims in that action if
they cannot properly be brought in the Noel Action.
Nipper lost his car.
Nipper had to pay money to the Ludwigs to resolve things with them.
Nipper has had to pay tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees.
And - THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT DOUGLAS should be held liable
to Nipper and the Ludwigs based upon Douglas' guilty pleas and the order of
restitution.
Nipper simply asks this Court to see that justice is done. Douglas is hiding
improperly behind a very suspect "corporate shield." On this record, that
corporate shield should not act to shelter Douglas from liability for his admitted
criminal fraud against Nipper and the Ludwigs.
Justice can only be done by Granting the Following Relief:
1.

Reversing Judge Noel and allowing these claims based upon the new
facts to proceed in that Court; or

2.

Directing that these claims be consolidated in the Fredericks Action;
and

3.

Reversing the grant of attorneys' fees.
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Respectfully submitted this 19th day of September, 2003.
Steffensen ••• Law ••• Office
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